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 II.-21 
HOSPICE CARE’S ADVENTURES IN 
FRAUDLAND: “BATTLE OF THE EXPERTS” 
& PROVING FALSITY UNDER THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT 
Abstract: In 2020, in United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives, the 
Third Circuit held that medical expert testimony alone is enough to demonstrate 
that a clinical judgment certifying a patient for hospice care is false. In doing so, 
the court rejected the objective falsehood standard, a fact-based inquiry that re-
quires more than a showing of a “reasonable disagreement” between medical ex-
perts to prove a claim is false. The holding has lasting implications for physician 
liability and allows questionable hospice care claims to flood the judiciary when-
ever a minor dispute over a patient’s life expectancy occurs. This Comment ar-
gues that the Third Circuit’s rejection of the objective falsehood standard does 
not align with either Supreme Court precedent or with the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid’s intent for the Medicare Hospice Benefit. Furthermore, this Com-
ment asserts that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to resolve the circuit 
split when it denied Care Alternatives’ petition for writ of certiorari in February 
2021. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress meant for the False Claims Act (FCA) to encompass any at-
tempt to defraud the government.1 Since the mid-1980s, however, the FCA has 
become a dominant force against healthcare fraud.2 Following Congress’s en-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (describing ways the FCA may subject an indi-
vidual to liability, how to bring an FCA suit, and how to determine plaintiff awards based on whether 
the government intervenes in a case or not); see also United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 
228, 232 (1968) (noting that Congress intends the FCA to “reach all types of fraud” and is “broadly 
phrased”); Jonathan Lester, The Winner Takes It All, but Who Gets to Play? The False Claims Act’s 
First to File Rule and Jurisdiction, 61 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-410, II.-414 to -15 (2020), http://law
digitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/iss9/36/ [https://perma.cc/HH62-ZU8F] (describing how the FCA, 
through its amendments, progressed into a “powerful fraud-fighting tool[]” following its passage dur-
ing the Civil War). See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers 
Over $2.2 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020 (Jan. 14, 2021), https:// www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2020 
[https://perma.cc/Y332-WJUA] (giving examples of FCA enforcement, showing that, in 2020, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered false claim money in several areas, such as healthcare, goods 
and services, and education).  
 2 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 (noting that 
the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) significantly increased the number of fraud 
cases brought for prosecution between 1983 and 1986); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
supra note 1 (noting that the DOJ recovered more than $1.8 billion in settlements and judgments from 
II.-22 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
actment of the Medicare Hospice Benefit (MHB) in 1983, both the number of 
Americans electing hospice care services and the number of Medicare-certified 
hospice providers significantly increased.3 This rise in hospice elections and 
certified hospice providers has made the hospice care industry a prime target 
for the FCA.4 
                                                                                                                           
the healthcare industry in fiscal year 2020). See generally Lester, supra note 1, at II.-414 to -15 (dis-
cussing how the FCA’s amendments during the 1980s led to the FCA’s use as a major enforcement 
mechanism against healthcare fraud and that the recoveries often come from many types of healthcare 
entities within the industry). Fraud within the healthcare system can take many forms and occurs 
when an entity intentionally fabricates the extent of a patient’s healthcare service to the government, 
with the intent of receiving a greater payout. See Health Care Fraud and Abuse, JOHNS HOPKINS 
HEALTHCARE LLC, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/johns_hopkins_healthcare/providers_physicians/
health_care_fraud_and_abuse/ [https://perma.cc/T6H9-57RD] (defining healthcare fraud and abuse). 
Examples of healthcare fraud can include, among others, billing for services that never occurred, bill-
ing for services that an entity knows are not medically needed, and incorrectly coding a medical ser-
vice on a reimbursement claim in an attempt to receive a greater financial recovery for it—commonly 
known as “up-coding.” See id. (providing examples of how healthcare fraud occurs). 
 3 See Mark T. Hughes & Thomas J. Smith, The Growth of Palliative Care in the United States, 35 
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 459, 460 (2014) (noting that the rise in palliative care over the years has 
coincided with an increased population of Americans 65 years and older). Hospice care incorporates a 
range of both conventional and holistic treatments into a patient’s care plan that are intended to ease 
suffering caused from a terminal illness. See Medicare Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 47,070, 47,070 (Aug. 4, 
2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418) (explaining the aims of hospice care). In 2018, for example, 
1.55 million Medicare beneficiaries elected hospice care. NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., 
NHPCO FACTS AND FIGURES: HOSPICE CARE IN AMERICA 6 (2020), https://www.nhpco.org/wp-
content/uploads/NHPCO-Facts-Figures-2020-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAP9-37P4]. There were 
also 4,639 Medicare-certified hospice providers in 2018, a 13.4% increase since 2014. Id. at 20. For-
profit Medicare hospice providers made up 69.7% of all hospice providers in the United States, an 
increase of 24.7% since 2014. Id. at 21. Only 3.4% of Medicare hospice providers were government-
owned. Id. Between 2013 and 2018, newly certified hospice providers—those certified for only two to 
five years—increased the most in the industry. Id. at 23. In 2018, hospice providers that were certified 
for more than ten years comprised 55% of the industry. Id. 
 4 See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 
2020) (litigating FCA charges for alleged Medicare reimbursement fraud originating from false hos-
pice care claims); see also United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses to Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 157–58 
(5th Cir. 2019) (litigating fraudulent hospice care claims); United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 
1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019) (same); United States v. Heartland Hospice, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 3d 884, 
889 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (same); United States ex rel. Geschrey v. Generations Healthcare, LLC, 922 
F. Supp. 2d 695, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., 
778 F. Supp. 2d 709, 713 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (same); see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., New 
York Hospice Provider Settles Civil Healthcare Fraud Allegations (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.
justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/new-york-hospice-provider-settles-civil-healthcare-fraud-allegations [https://
perma.cc/6GLU-GWXM] (noting that a NY hospice provider intentionally made false claims for 
hospice care treatment and agreed to pay a total of $5.2 million in settlement). See generally Ashleigh 
Garrison, Medicare’s Most Indefensible Fraud Hotspot: Hospice Care, CNBC (Aug. 2, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/medicares-most-despicable-indefensible-fraud-hotspot-hospice-care.html 
[https://perma.cc/U6Y4-NWZH] (explaining that hospice care centers engaging in fraudulent practices 
is an increasing problem); Douglas Frantz, Hospice Boom Is Giving Rise to New Fraud, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/10/us/hospice-boom-is-giving-rise-to-newfraud.
html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/T97P-S7PC] (describing how hospice care providers 
commit healthcare fraud by misrepresenting an individual’s illness to qualify for hospice care). 
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Patients eligible for Medicare Part A qualify for the MHB and may elect 
to enter hospice care with a Medicare-certified hospice provider.5 To receive 
hospice care services, a physician first certifies that a patient is terminally ill, 
meaning that—without curative treatment—he or she has a life expectancy of 
six months or less.6 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
values physicians’ clinical judgments and has purposefully chosen not to pro-
vide rigidly defined hospice eligibility criteria.7 Therefore, a hospice certifica-
tion hinges on the certifying physician’s clinical judgment.8 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Medicare Program; Hospice Care, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008, 56,008 (Dec. 16, 1983) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420, 421, 489) (describing the Medicare Hospice Bene-
fit (MHB), which includes hospice care as a covered service under federal health insurance, Medicare 
Part A). See generally What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-
covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare [https://perma.cc/LXK3-TPQT] (noting that 
the federal health insurance program, called Medicare, is available for individuals age 65 or older). 
Medicare Part A is for hospital insurance, which covers hospice care. Id. Hospice centers must meet 
federal requirements, including Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) certification and 
approval to participate in Medicare. Hospices, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/CertificationandComplianc/Hospices 
[https://perma.cc/2XWS-HF68]. For approval to participate in Medicare, a hospice center must meet, 
among other things, requirements pertaining to maintaining “quality of care” and “infection control,” 
offering certain primary services, and hiring appropriate licensed professionals. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 418.50–.116 (2020) (listing hospice provider requirements to participate in the MHB). A hospice 
provider can be its own separate facility, part of a hospital or nursing home, or can take place in a 
patient’s home. Hospice Care, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/hospice-care 
[https://perma.cc/W59R-VX2J]. 
 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (defining “terminally ill” and describing certification require-
ments); 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (defining “terminally ill”). 
 7 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 (noting that, although CMS has contemplated changing hos-
pice eligibility criteria, it has chosen not to amend the current requirements (citing Medicare and Med-
icaid Programs; Hospice Conditions of Participation, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,008, 32,138 (June 5, 2008) (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418))). Comments from CMS’s rulemaking also indicated that “well-
founded clinical judgments should be granted deference.” Id. at 1295. A hospice certification relies on 
a physician’s or medical director’s clinical judgment and must include, at a minimum, (1) a diagnosis 
of a terminal illness, (2) clinical information that buttresses a terminally ill prognosis, and (3) a certi-
fying physician’s explanation describing why the clinical information provided bolsters the prognosis. 
42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1295 (explaining that CMS did not use the 
term “criteria” when defining hospice certification requirements because it did not want to suggest 
that a patient’s illness must satisfy specific “clinical benchmarks” in order for a physician to certify a 
patient as terminally ill (citing Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Hospice Conditions of Participation, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 32,138)). CMS also acknowledged that a certifying physician is best situated to make 
a terminally ill prognosis based on their knowledge and experience. Id. (citing Medicare Program, 78 
Fed. Reg. 48,234, 48,247 (Aug. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418)). See generally 
AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1283 (explaining that CMS is run “locally” using Medicare Administrative 
Contractors that are responsible for managing claims and approving or denying payments); About 
CMS, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS [https://perma.cc/XGT8-AMXD] 
(noting that CMS is part of HHS). 
 8 See Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 48,247 (discussing that a certifying physician must 
perform a thorough review of a patient’s clinical history before certifying him or her for hospice); see 
also supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the certifying physician’s role in the hospice 
certification process). 
II.-24 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
In 2019, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. AseraCare, Inc., consid-
ered whether dueling medical expert testimony regarding a patient’s terminally 
ill prognosis is enough to demonstrate falsity under the FCA.9 The court held 
that reasonably conflicting opinions, without additional factual evidence, is 
insufficient to create a triable issue of fact.10 It explained that, as a subjective 
medical opinion, a clinical judgment is only false if it is “objectively false.”11 
The objective falsehood standard requires a plaintiff to show that a physician 
certified a patient for hospice relying on an inadequately made clinical judg-
ment.12 In 2020, however, the Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Druding v. 
Care Alternatives (Druding II), faced a similar question and concluded that 
contesting medical expert testimony is enough to survive summary judgment.13 
In doing so, the court split from the Eleventh Circuit and rejected the objective 
falsehood standard.14 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of hospice certification re-
quirements, the FCA, the objective falsehood standard, and the Third Circuit’s 
holding in Druding II.15 Part II examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Uni-
versal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar and its influence 
over circuit courts’ application of the objective falsehood standard.16 Lastly, 
Part III argues that the objective falsehood standard is appropriate to use for 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1293 (noting that the statute’s wording expresses that a clinical 
judgment used to certify a patient for hospice care “lies at the center of the eligibility inquiry”). 
 10 Id. at 1297. In AseraCare, the court concluded that the government needed to show more than a 
medical expert’s dissent of a patient’s terminally ill prognosis to demonstrate that a clinical judgment 
regarding hospice eligibility is false. Id. 
 11 See id. at 1297, 1302 (discussing how to determine whether a clinical judgment is “objectively 
false,” which requires additional factual evidence outside of a medical expert’s opinion). Throughout 
the AseraCare case, the Eleventh Circuit uses terminology, such as “objective falsehood” and “objec-
tively false.” See id. at 1290, 1300, 1302. But see United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives 
(Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 90 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that, for a successful FCA claim, plaintiffs do not 
need to prove a clinical judgment is “objectively false”). 
 12 AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297. Specifically, a claim would be false under the objective false-
hood standard if a plaintiff could show “facts and circumstances” that demonstrate that a physician 
certified a patient for hospice relying on a clinical judgment that was not “properly formed and sin-
cerely held.” Id. at 1281, 1297. If a physician did not perform a comprehensive review of a patient’s 
medical records before certifying, or did not believe a patient was eligible for hospice but certified 
him or her regardless, this could demonstrate that a physician’s clinical judgment was not “properly 
formed.” Id. at 1297. 
 13 Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95. The Third Circuit concluded that medical expert testimony ques-
tioning a patient’s hospice eligibility creates a triable issue of fact as to the falsity of a hospice certifi-
cation claim. Id. 
 14 Id. The Druding II court stated that the objective falsehood standard is incompatible with the 
FCA’s interpretation of “false” and does not follow the Third Circuit’s own falsity analysis as applied 
to the FCA. Id. 
 15 See infra notes 18–54 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 55–86 and accompanying text. 
2021] Proving the Falsity of Clinical Judgments Under the False Claims Act II.-25 
hospice certification claims and discusses why it properly aligns with Supreme 
Court precedent and CMS’s intent for the MHB.17 
I. DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: THE FCA AND HOSPICE CERTIFICATION,  
THE OBJECTIVE FALSEHOOD STANDARD, AND THE  
THIRD CIRCUIT’S HOLDING18 
The False Claims Act (FCA) empowers the government to take action and 
recoup financial losses from those endeavoring to defraud the federal govern-
ment.19 Through its amendments, the FCA has advanced into a major legal in-
strument that the government uses to curtail Medicare reimbursement fraud.20 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the MHB and how the FCA 
combats healthcare fraud.21 Section B introduces the elements of an FCA 
claim, discusses what makes a claim “false,” and explains the objective false-
hood standard.22 Lastly, Section C discusses the Third Circuit’s rejection of the 
objective falsehood standard.23 
A. Hospice Care, the Medicare Hospice Benefit, and the FCA 
Hospice care is an “interdisciplinary” palliative care program for termi-
nally ill patients.24 In 1983, Congress passed the MHB, giving Medicare bene-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 87–119 and accompanying text. 
 18 Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 1–14 (VolumeOne Publishing 
ed., 1998) (1865). The first chapter of the book is entitled “Down the Rabbit Hole” where Alice finds 
herself chasing after the White Rabbit straight down into his rabbit hole, not contemplating how she 
might find her way back out. Id. at 3. 
 19 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733; see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5267 (expressing that the aim of the False Claims Act was to provide the government with a 
way to recover losses caused by fraud against the government); see also United States v. Bornstein, 
423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976) (noting that the original purpose of the FCA, enacted in 1863, was to thwart 
Civil War contractors’ efforts to defraud the government). 
 20 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 1 (noting that the DOJ recovered more than 
$1.8 billion in healthcare fraud); see also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (stating that HHS raised triple the 
number of healthcare fraud cases for prosecution between 1983 and 1986). 
 21 See infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
 24 See 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2020) (defining hospice care). A patient is terminally ill if the medical 
prognosis determines a life expectancy of six months or less without any curative medical interven-
tion. Id. Hospice care includes a set of “interdisciplinary” services that a patient’s individualized care 
program sets forth. Id. A hospice “interdisciplinary” team can be made up of a variety of health pro-
fessionals from different specialties such as physicians, social workers, spiritual counselors, and ther-
apists. Id. § 418.56. Hospice care shifts the types of medical services provided from curative care to 
palliative care, whereby the goal is to help a terminally ill patient feel physically and emotionally at 
ease in the final months of their life. Medicare Program; Hospice Care, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008, 56,008 
(Dec. 16, 1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420, 421, 489). Palliative 
care focuses on the patient and family and aims to minimize the suffering a terminal illness may 
cause. 42 C.F.R. § 418.3. Curative care, in contrast, is care that is meant to cure a medical condition, 
II.-26 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
ficiaries the right to elect hospice care.25 Patients qualify for the MHB if they 
are eligible for Medicare Part A and have a terminally ill prognosis.26 A physi-
cian and medical director initially certify a patient for a ninety-day hospice 
care period and may recertify the patient for additional ninety-day or sixty-day 
periods.27 The physician’s clinical judgment serves as the basis for each certi-
fication.28 The certification must “accompany” a patient’s medical documenta-
tion, along with a physician’s personal written report that “supports” the termi-
nally ill prognosis.29 
                                                                                                                           
meaning a patient can recover from their illness. Brooker Wheeler, The ABC’s of Curative, Palliative 
and Hospice Care, WHEELER HEALTH (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.hopehealthco.org/blog/the-abcs-of-
curative-palliative-and-hospice-care/ [https://perma.cc/86HR-EEK7]. An individual waives curative 
care once they elect hospice care under Medicare. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(b)(2) (noting that selecting 
hospice care constitutes a patient’s agreement to receive palliative, as opposed to curative, care). 
 25 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(C) (noting that Medicare will not pay for palliative care services re-
ceived in hospice that are not “reasonable and necessary”); see also Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 
48,234, 48,236 (Aug. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418) (stating that the MHB requires that 
services provided in hospice be “reasonable and necessary”); see infra note 43 and accompanying text 
(defining what “reasonable and necessary” means for purposes of Medicare reimbursement). 
 26 42 C.F.R. § 418.20; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Medicare eligibility 
and what Medicare Part A is). 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 418.21. An individual may elect to receive hospice 
care during multiple periods, the first being an initial 90-day period. 42 C.F.R.§ 418.21. The hospice 
medical director and the patient’s attending physician initially “certify in writing” prior to the start of 
the period that the patient is eligible for hospice. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7). Following the initial ninety-
day period, only one physician is required to recertify the patient for a subsequent ninety-day or sixty-
day period. 42 C.F.R. § 418.21, 22(a)(5). There is no limit to the number of permitted sixty-day certi-
fication periods. Id. § 418.21. When a patient nears their third recertification, a hospice physician or 
nurse practitioner must meet with the patient in person and obtain additional clinical information that 
“supports” hospice care recertification. Id. § 418.22(a)(4). Every recertification thereafter mandates 
face-to-face meetings. Id. An “attending physician” is a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, nurse prac-
titioner, or physician assistant employed with a hospice provider whom the patient identifies as being 
most familiar with their illness and can make an effective treatment plan for the patient’s care while in 
hospice. See id. § 418.3 (defining “attending physician”). The MHB acknowledges that a patient’s 
health may get better during his or her stay in hospice, so it permits patients to leave hospice and re-
sume other medical treatment. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 
2019) (citing Medicare Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,372, 70,448 (Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 409, 418, 424, 484, 489)). Even if a patient does exhibit signs of temporary improvement, 
a physician may still recertify the patient for hospice care if the patient’s health is expected to worsen. 
42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b); Medicare Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,448. 
 28 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1295 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that CMS acknowledges that deter-
mining a terminally ill patient’s life expectancy is not an “exact science,” however, a hospice certifi-
cation still relies on a certifying physician’s clinical judgment to determine if a patient is eligible). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A); see also 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1)–(2) (noting that medical docu-
ments that “support the medical prognosis must accompany the certification”); Medicare Program, 79 
Fed. Reg. 50,452, 50,470 (Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 418). In determining 
hospice eligibility, the medical director, at a minimum, must review the records that buttress the ter-
minally ill diagnosis, along with any other medical issues or disorders that may be associated with the 
terminal illness. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.25(b)(1)–(3) (discussing requirements for admitting a patient to 
hospice care); see also supra notes 7, 27 and accompanying text (discussing certification and eligibil-
ity requirements). 
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Since the MHB’s passage, FCA cases alleging hospice fraud have risen.30 
Most often, these cases are initially qui tam actions.31 Individuals—known as 
relators—file qui tam complaints in camera and the court then seals it for no 
less than sixty days.32 During that time, the DOJ will decide whether to inter-
vene.33 If the DOJ declines to prosecute, the relator(s) may continue with the 
suit and potentially receive a portion of the recovery.34 
B. What Makes a Claim “False” Under the FCA? 
A hospice provider can be liable for false claims under an implied false cer-
tification theory of liability.35 Liability attaches if the hospice center intentionally 
submits or causes submission of a fabricated Medicare reimbursement claim for 
the purpose of receiving payment.36 A hospice provider’s reimbursement claims 
may be false if the claims exclude or distort material information.37 Therefore, 
the four prima facie elements of an FCA suit include: (1) falsity, (2) causation, 
(3) scienter (knowledge), and (4) materiality.38 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting recent hospice care fraud cases). 
 31 See Lester, supra note 1, at II.-411 (describing how an individual may bring an FCA claim on 
behalf of the U.S. government through a qui tam action); see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
supra note 1 (noting that relators filed 672 qui tam suits in 2020 and the DOJ recovered over $1.6 
billion in qui tam settlements this past year). Compare United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alterna-
tives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs were former employees of hospice care 
center and the government chose not to join the case seven years after relators initially filed the com-
plaint), with AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1282 (plaintiffs were former employees of hospice care center 
and the government intervened).  
 32 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)–(2). While the complaint is under seal, the court may not order service 
on the defendant. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 33 Id. § 3730(b)(1)–(4). During the sixty-day period, or any extension periods, the government 
must decide whether or not to take on the case. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(A)–(B). 
 34 Id. § 3730(d)(2). The court will determine the amount to collect for civil penalties and damag-
es, but it cannot be less than 25% or more than 30% of the amount recovered. Id. If the relator’s claim 
is successful, they are also entitled to recover any expenses the court deems “reasonable,” including 
attorney expenses. Id. 
 35 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016) 
(defining the implied false certification theory). The implied false certification theory states that a 
claim may be false when the claim wrongly implies adherence to any material statutes and regulations 
that would prompt government payment. Id. 
 36 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Specifically, a person is liable under the FCA if that person “know-
ingly” submits or allows submission of a “false or fraudulent” claim for the purposes of obtaining 
“payment or approval” from the government. Id. The term “knowing” (or “knowingly”) means an 
individual who has “actual knowledge,” or “acts in deliberate ignorance,” or demonstrates “reckless 
disregard” concerning the veracity of the particulars. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). The FCA does not 
require evidence showing “specific intent to defraud” the government. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
 37 Id. § 3729(a)(1)(B). Under the FCA, the term “material” means anything included in the sub-
mitted claim that may be a critical factor in persuading the government to approve or deny the claim 
for payment. Id. § 3729(b)(4). 
 38 See id. § 3729(a) (defining what makes a claim “false or fraudulent”); see also United States ex 
rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that plaintiff 
must prove the four prima facie elements of an FCA claim to survive summary judgment (citing Unit-
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Courts generally recognize two types of false reimbursement claims: fac-
tually false and legally false claims.39 A factually false claim conveys inaccu-
rate facts.40 A legally false claim occurs when a claimant (1) wrongly certi-
fies—either explicitly or impliedly—adherence with statutes or regulations 
that are essential for payment, or (2) deliberately excludes noncompliant in-
formation that is material and known to the person or entity submitting the 
claim.41 Some courts have adopted the objective falsehood standard, requiring 
plaintiffs to provide additional objective evidence to demonstrate a claim is 
false.42 As an example, circuit courts have inconsistently applied this falsity 
standard in medical necessity and hospice certification claims.43 
                                                                                                                           
ed States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech, Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017))). Unlike the terms 
“knowingly” or “material,” Congress never defined the terms “false” or “fraudulent,” and the Su-
preme Court did not speak to the issue until 2016 in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States 
ex rel. Escobar. See 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) (holding that the common-law meanings of “false” 
and “fraudulent” apply to the FCA). “False” means something that a person purposefully crafted to be 
untrue with the intent to deceive others. See False, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
“Fraudulent” is a term that also embodies the common-law meaning of “fraud.” See Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1999 (noting that when Congress wrote the FCA, it did not define “false” or “fraudulent,” there-
fore, the terms retain their common-law meaning). Throughout this Comment, the term “false” is also 
used to encompass the term “false or fraudulent” in relation to the FCA’s phrasing. 
 39 See Druding II, 952 F.3d at 96–97 (discussing the types of false claims); United States ex rel. 
Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). 
 40 Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 305; see also United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 
730, 741 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that to prove factual falsity, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a sub-
mitted claim contains inaccurate information). 
 41 See Polukoff, 895 F.3d at 741 (explaining legal falsity and two types of theories that fall under 
legal falsity—express and implied legal falsity). An example of express legal falsity is a claim that 
affirmatively and falsely certifies that a hospice provider complied with a relevant legal requirement 
that is essential for payment. Id. An example of implied legal falsity is the actual submission of a false 
claim in which, by submitting the claim, the submitter wrongly implies that it should receive payment. 
Id. The question of whether the falsity analysis includes both factual and legal falsity has been a point 
of contention among courts. Compare Druding II, 952 F.3d at 97 (noting that an inquiry of falsity 
should include both factual and legal falsity), with Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc. (Druding I), 346 
F. Supp. 3d 669, 688 (D.N.J. 2018) (adopting the view that a plaintiff needs factual evidence to show 
a physician made a “knowingly false determination,” which Druding II criticized as only analyzing 
factual falsity). Legal falsity can include scenarios involving factual falsity. Druding II, 952 F.3d at 
96–97. 
 42 See United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1297 n.10 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
district courts have held that for a claim to be false under the FCA, a plaintiff must show “objectively 
verifiable fact[s]” that are in conflict with the accounts made in a claim (quoting United States ex rel. 
Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 709, 718 (N.D. Tex. 2011))); see also United States 
ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 836 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a statement 
can only be false under the FCA if the statement “represents an objective falsehood”); United States 
ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 F. App’x 980, 982 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the FCA 
“requires proof of an objective falsehood” (citing United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 
168 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1999))). 
 43 Compare Druding II, 952 F.3d at 95 (rejecting the objective falsehood standard), and Winter ex 
rel. United States v. Garden Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (same), 
and United States ex rel. Scott v. Ariz. Ctr. for Hematology & Oncology, PLC, No. CV-16-03703, 
WL 2059926, at *12 (D. Ariz. 2020) (same), with AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (embracing the objec-
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C. The Third Circuit Rejects the Objective Falsehood Standard  
in the Context of Hospice Care Certifications 
In 2020, in United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding 
II), the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether and when clinical judg-
ments regarding hospice care certifications are false.44 In 2018, in Druding v. 
Care Alternatives, Inc. (Druding I), former employees of Care Alternatives 
hospice center brought a qui tam action in the District Court of New Jersey.45 
The relators alleged that Care Alternatives submitted false claims to the gov-
ernment for ineligible hospice care patients.46 At trial, the parties presented 
competing medical expert testimony.47 The relators’ medical expert concluded 
that of the 603 hospice certification periods he reviewed, thirty-five percent 
did not justify a need for hospice.48 Care Alternatives’ medical expert, howev-
                                                                                                                           
tive falsehood standard). Although a certifying physician’s or hospice medical director’s clinical 
judgment controls hospice care certifications, CMS must deem a medical service “reasonable and 
necessary” to approve payment of medical necessity claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (explain-
ing that Medicare will not cover services used to diagnose or treat an illness or injury if that service is 
not “reasonable and necessary”). CMS, when determining whether a procedure is “reasonable and 
necessary,” considers the following, inter alia: (1) whether the procedure is “safe and effective”; (2) 
whether the procedure is “experimental or investigational”; (3) whether the procedure is “appropriate” 
and performed based on accepted medical standards; and (4) whether the environment for the proce-
dure meets a patient’s “medical needs” and is equipped with qualified employees. See CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., REVISED MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL 13.5.4 (2019) 
(describing factors that are taken into account when considering whether to approve a medical neces-
sity claim for reimbursement). Any palliative care given once a patient is in hospice must meet the 
reasonable and necessary standard for approval of payment. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(C).  
 44 952 F.3d at 92. The main questions the Third Circuit addressed were (1) how to properly ana-
lyze falsity under the FCA in the context of a hospice certification claim, and (2) whether a medical 
expert’s opinion challenging a certifying physician’s terminally ill prognosis could demonstrate that a 
clinical judgement, and therefore, a hospice certification claim, is false. Id. at 92, 95. 
 45 Druding I, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 671. Care Alternatives hired many types of employees, such as 
chaplains, social workers, physicians, and therapists. Id. at 673. These employees worked with inde-
pendent physicians who acted in the capacity of hospice medical directors. Id. The employees and the 
independent physicians formed an “interdisciplinary” committee that met bimonthly to discuss current 
hospice patient care plans and any patients due for recertification. Id. 
 46 Id. at 673. For example, one plaintiff alleged that a patient was not eligible for hospice because 
the patient walked on her own, engaged in conversation, and gained weight while in hospice care. Id. 
at 677. Another plaintiff alleged that Care Alternatives told her to indicate on the certification form 
that a patient could not converse with others, even though the patient was able to engage in conversa-
tion. Id. at 678. The patient also had schizophrenia, an illness that would have precluded hospice care 
eligibility, yet Care Alternatives admitted him anyway. Id. A third plaintiff, who was not a physician, 
testified that, although she believed 10% of patients at Care Alternatives were not hospice eligible, she 
had never reported any questionable certifications to Care Alternative’s compliance department. Id. at 
679. Other plaintiffs testified that Care Alternatives altered medical records to make patients appear 
eligible. Id. at 680.  
 47 See id. at 681 (outlining medical expert testimony given for plaintiff and defendant). 
 48 Id. The relators’ medical expert, Dr. Jayes, explained that making a terminally ill prognosis 
depends on a physician’s judgment and experience, as well as available medical sources. Id. When 
determining whether Care Alternatives’ patients were hospice eligible, Dr. Jayes used guidelines from 
the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization and other industry guidance documents that 
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er, concluded that a physician could have plausibly reached the opposite con-
clusion for each certification period the relator’s expert deemed ineligible.49 
The district court followed Third Circuit precedent and concluded that “rea-
sonable” variations in opinion between medical experts could not support a 
finding that a clinical judgment is false.50 In granting summary judgment, the 
court used the objective falsehood standard and held that the relators’ medical 
expert did not sufficiently show that the hospice claims were false.51 
The relators appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that the objective 
falsehood standard was not appropriate to use.52 The court split from the Elev-
enth Circuit, stating that the objective falsehood standard: (1) is incompatible 
with the common-law meaning of “false” under the FCA; (2) diverges from the 
circuit’s own interpretations of the requirements for legal falsity; and (3) merg-
es the elements of falsity and knowledge by requiring objective evidence to 
prove falsity.53 The court concluded that an expert medical opinion can show a 
claim violates regulations that require support for a terminally ill prognosis 
and, therefore, is false.54 
                                                                                                                           
hospice centers generally use to determine patient eligibility. Id. In reviewing forty-seven medical 
records, he concluded that twenty-six were eligible for hospice during all certification periods, where-
as sixteen were eligible for only a part of their care. Id. In his testimony, Dr. Jayes also stated that a 
“reasonable physician” could have disagreed with his findings and that making a terminally ill prog-
nosis is a challenging undertaking. Id. at 688. 
 49 Id. at 681. 
 50 Id. at 687–88. The court cited to a previous Third Circuit case, where the court stated that opin-
ions and conclusive statements—including those that are “scientific”—in which “reasonable minds” 
may vary cannot be false. Id. at 687 (citing United States ex rel. Hill v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of 
N.J., 448 F. App’x 314, 316 (3d Cir. 2011)). The court stated that the “ultimate issue” to determine 
was whether the physician certified a patient for hospice knowing that they were ineligible, not about 
whether the clinical judgment itself was right or wrong. Id. at 688. 
 51 See id. at 688. (stating that “diverging opinions cannot create a genuine issue of material fact 
about the falsity of a physician’s determinations that the patient meets hospice eligibility where, as 
here, there is no factual evidence that Defendant’s certifying doctor was making a knowingly false 
determination”). This statement signals that varying medical expert opinions concerning a patient’s 
hospice eligibility do not lend to the relevant issue, which is whether a physician certified a patient for 
hospice believing that the patient was not in fact eligible. See id. (discussing that the hospice eligibil-
ity inquiry is not about whether a clinical judgment is right or wrong).  
 52 United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(stating that the Third Circuit had not yet accepted the objective falsehood standard or ever used it in 
any of its false claims cases). When discussing the conflation issue, the court noted that scienter is a 
more difficult element to satisfy under the FCA and would therefore prevent FCA liability over an 
ordinary disagreement between medical experts. Id. at 110. 
 53 See id. at 95–98 (explaining the court’s reasoning for rejecting the objective falsehood stand-
ard). The Third Circuit also stated that “objectivity” was appropriate to incorporate into the FCA, but 
aligned more with the scienter element, rather than the falsity element. Id. at 100. 
 54 Id. at 97–98. The Third Circuit held that, under the FCA, falsity must include a legal falsity 
analysis, and therefore, the district court should not have narrowed its falsity analysis to factual falsity. 
See id. at 96–97 (relying on a Tenth Circuit case to make its assertion that the proper falsity analysis 
under the FCA includes legal falsity, which also can include factual falsity (citing United States ex rel. 
Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 741 (10th Cir. 2018))); see also supra note 41 and ac-
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II. A MAD TEA-PARTY: FIVE CIRCUITS ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE  
“FALSITY OF CLINICAL JUDGMENTS” RIDDLE AFTER  
THE SUPREME COURT ADDS A TWIST55 
Congress never defined the words “false” or “fraudulent” when it passed 
the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1863.56 Judicial interpretation defined these 
terms, resulting in a variety of falsity standards.57 Over 153 years later, in Uni-
versal Healthcare Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme 
Court clarified their meanings.58 Section A of this Part discusses how the Su-
preme Court defined “false” and “fraudulent.”59 Section B analyzes the Sixth 
and Tenth Circuits’ holdings that clinical judgments can be false and trigger 
FCA liability.60 Section C explains the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of the ob-
jective falsehood standard as applied to clinical judgments for hospice certifi-
cation.61 Lastly, Section D describes the Tenth Circuit’s most recent decision 
rejecting the objective falsehood standard in the context of medical necessity.62 
                                                                                                                           
companying text (discussing factual and legal falsity). The MHB requires that a patient have a termi-
nally illness and that that documentation supporting the prognosis accompany the certification. See 
supra notes 7, 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing hospice certification and eligibility require-
ments). The Third Circuit stated that under the legal falsity analysis, the relators needed to show that 
Care Alternatives did not satisfy the requirements under 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b). Druding II, 952 F.3d 
at 97. Therefore, a challenging medical expert opinion could show evidence that the medical reports 
provided did not justify a terminally ill prognosis. Id. A lack of support for the prognosis demonstrates 
that the clinical judgment used to certify a patient for hospice care is false. Id. The court also cited to a 
Sixth Circuit case that relied on medical expert testimony to show that a cardiologist lied about the 
severity of arterial blockage in his patients’ clinical records. See id. at 98 (citing United States v. Pau-
lus, 894 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2018)). In United States v. Paulus, the Sixth Circuit stated that opin-
ions may trigger FCA liability when the person making the opinion does not earnestly believe the 
opinion, or when they are aware of information that is irreconcilable with the opinion. 894 F.3d at 275 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1976)). In reaching this holding, 
the Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected the bright-line rule that a doctor’s clinical judgment can never be 
false. Id. at 275; see also infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (discussing the Paulus case in 
more detail).  
 55 Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 95–111 (VolumeOne Publishing 
ed., 1998) (1865). The seventh chapter of the book is entitled “A Mad Tea-Party” where Alice attends 
a party that turns into a discussion of riddles. Id. Alice claims that to say what you mean and to mean 
what you say are the same thing, but everyone at the party disagrees. Id. at 98. Alice becomes annoyed 
and leaves the tea party. Id. at 110–11. 
 56 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (lacking definitions for “false” or “fraudulent”); Universal Healthcare 
Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) (noting that Congress never 
explicitly defined what “false or fraudulent” means under the FCA). 
 57 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing whether the falsity analysis under the 
FCA includes both factual and legal falsity). 
 58 See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Supreme Court Broadly Defines What Makes a Claim False Under 
the FCA and Holds That Opinions Can Be False Statements 
In Escobar, the Supreme Court held that the FCA comprises the common-
law meanings of the terms “false” and “fraudulent.”63 Common-law fraud can 
include, inter alia, claims that contain “half-truths.”64 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court cited to a 2015 Supreme Court decision: Omnicare, Inc. v. La-
borers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund.65 In Omnicare, 
the Court held that, for purposes of attaching FCA liability to securities regula-
tions, disingenuous or intentionally deceptive opinions can be false state-
ments.66 In Escobar, the Court discussed that the more “rigorous” materiality 
and scienter requirements would assuage concerns that its holding increased 
physician liability.67 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Universal Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999, 2002 
(2016) (citing Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732–33 (2013)). In 2013, in Sekhar v. United 
States, the Court noted that when a statute does not define a term, a court should apply its common-
law meaning. 570 U.S. at 732–33. The issues in Escobar centered on the requirements for proving an 
FCA claim based on the implied false certification theory. 136 S. Ct. at 1999. The Court did not want 
to provide a rigid rule for determining whether a claim is false, so it instead adopted a “demanding” 
materiality test, the Escobar materiality test. See id. at 2002–03 (discussing reasoning for not imple-
menting a restricted view of what makes a claim false). The Escobar materiality test requires that (1) 
compliance with a regulation, statute, or contract be material to the government’s decision to provide 
payment, and (2) that the alleged violator had knowledge that such compliance was material to the 
government’s decision to approve payment. See id. (describing what satisfies the materiality test). 
 64 See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2000, 2001 n.3 (discussing that a person must divulge a sufficient 
amount of information such that their statement does not misinform others in both tort and contract 
law). “Half-truths” are “representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical 
qualifying information.” Id. at 2000. 
 65 See id. at 2004 (reversing and remanding the First Circuit’s judgment because the complaint 
did not line up with the Supreme Court’s common-law interpretation of “false” or “fraudulent” in 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (citing Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
575 U.S. 175, 195–96 (2015))). 
 66 See Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 184 (noting that § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 regarding false 
statements may apply to opinions). In Omnicare, investors claimed that Omnicare’s registration 
statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission contained opinions that were “material-
ly false.” Id. at 180–81. Under § 11’s false statement provision, a company may be liable if the regis-
tration statement contains (1) a false material fact or (2) leaves out a material fact that, if included, 
would make the statement “misleading.” Id. at 179; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (explaining a securi-
ty buyer’s right of action for statements an issuer makes in a registration statement). To determine if a 
statement is misleading, the court engages in an “objective inquiry” using a “reasonable investor” 
standard. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 176. The Supreme Court asserted that an opinion could be false if the 
opinion-holder does not truthfully believe the opinion or provides fictional facts to bolster the opin-
ion’s truth. Id. at 185–86. The Court also concluded that “sincere statements of pure opinion” are not 
untrue material claims even if someone shows later in time that the opinion is inaccurate. Id. at 186. 
 67 See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (discussing its materiality standard). The Supreme Court reit-
erated that the materiality standard is “rigorous” and that the FCA is not a tool for prosecuting trivial 
noncompliance with statutes or regulations. Id. at 2003. Only a material misrepresentation that im-
pacts the government’s decision to provide payment can trigger FCA liability. Id. at 2002. Even if the 
government expressly identifies a provision that is essential for payment, it does not automatically 
mean it is material. Id. at 2003. Materiality can include evidence that a defendant had knowledge that 
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B. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits Hold That Clinical Judgments  
Can Be False in the Context of Medical Necessity 
In 2018, in United States v. Paulus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed whether claims submitted for interpreting angiograms were false.68 
The cardiologist allegedly exaggerated the amount of arterial blockage in pa-
tients’ records to facilitate claim approvals.69 The court held that interpreting 
the severity of arterial blockage is a verifiable fact.70 Importantly, the Sixth 
Circuit stated that clinical judgments can trigger FCA liability when a person 
asserts an opinion they do not truly believe or when they have knowledge of 
facts that contradict their opinion.71 
Also in 2018, in United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly addressed the falsity of a physician’s 
                                                                                                                           
the government refused payment for certain claims in the past due to violations of certain “statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement[s].” Id. The Escobar ruling has affected how lower courts use 
the objective falsehood standard in the context of clinical judgments. Compare United States ex rel. 
Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting the objective 
falsehood standard), and Winter ex rel. United States v. Garden Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 
1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (same), with United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th 
Cir. 2019) (embracing the objective falsehood standard). Interestingly, because of Escobar’s reference 
to Omnicare, circuit courts have cited to Omnicare to both support and discredit the objective false-
hood standard. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 194–95). Compare Druding 
II, 952 F.3d at 95 (noting that, because opinions can be false statements under securities regulations, 
medical opinions can be false (citing Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 183–86)), with AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 
1297 (stating that even if a medical expert can show a clinical judgment is inaccurate, it is not false if 
the certifying physician truthfully believed that the patient was eligible for hospice care at the time of 
certification (citing Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 185–86)). 
 68 United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2018) (addressing how cardiologists 
measure arterial blockage and determine whether a cardiac procedure is medically necessary). 
 69 Id. at 272–73. Dr. Paulus, a cardiologist at King’s Daughters Medical Center (KDMC) in Ash-
land, Kentucky, was ranked first in the nation for the amount billed to Medicare for angiograms. Id. at 
272. Angiograms are images that a cardiac catheterization procedure produces that can allow a physi-
cian to see the amount of arterial blockage. Id. at 271. If an angiogram reveals at least 70% blockage, 
a stent is inserted to open the artery and improve blood flow with the intent of preventing heart at-
tacks. Id. Cardiologists may interpret angiograms differently, leading to an “inter-observer variability” 
between 10% and 20%. Id. at 272. This variability generally occurs more often when the angiogram 
shows blockage in the 50%–70% range. Id. In 2008, HHS began investigating Dr. Paulus and auditing 
his angiogram cases. Id. at 272–73. The auditing cardiologist at HHS determined that of nineteen 
angiogram cases, seven cases were medically unnecessary. Id. at 273. A private insurance company 
also performed an audit of Dr. Paulus and concluded that out of eleven angiograms, at least half were 
not medically necessary. Id. 
 70 Id. at 275. The Sixth Circuit concluded that if a physician knowingly exaggerated the amount 
of blockage viewed on an angiogram, then they have submitted a false claim. Id. 
 71 Id. at 275–76. The Sixth Circuit further concluded that Dr. Paulus was not contributing his own 
medical opinion, but was distorting facts by consistently lying about the severity of blockage on angi-
ograms to receive reimbursement for medically unnecessary procedures. Id. at 276. Although the court 
did not explicitly reject or adopt the objective falsehood standard, it disagreed with the district court’s 
conclusion that clinical judgments are subjective, and therefore, can never be verified or disputed. Id. 
at 275. The Sixth Circuit reiterated that it wanted to set a well-defined standard that proving a state-
ment is false requires proving that a statement can be verified or challenged. Id. 
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clinical judgment.72 There, a physician performed cardiac surgical procedures 
allegedly knowing the procedures violated CMS’s medical necessity guide-
lines.73 In its holding, the Tenth Circuit declared that a clinical judgment can 
be false under the FCA because the FCA covers a wide range of fraud, an opin-
ion is not absolved of liability, and a claim for medically unnecessary services 
or procedures triggers liability.74 
C. The Eleventh Circuit Embraces the Objective Falsehood Standard  
in the Context of Hospice Care Certification 
In 2019, in United States v. AseraCare, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit reviewed 
the question of when a clinical judgment is false with respect to hospice eligibil-
ity.75 AseraCare, a hospice care network, allegedly submitted false claims for 
palliative services performed for patients who were not terminally ill.76 The 
                                                                                                                           
 72 United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 737 (10th Cir. 2018). Dr. 
Polukoff filed a qui tam action against Dr. Sorensen, Sorenson Cardiovascular Group, and Intermoun-
tain Healthcare, Inc., alleging that the parties submitted false Medicare reimbursement claims for 
medically unnecessary cardiac procedures. Id. at 738. The government declined to intervene. Id. at 
739. 
 73 Id. at 737. Dr. Polukoff claimed that Dr. Sorensen’s procedures were not medically necessary 
and, therefore, the reimbursement claims submitted were legally false. Id. at 739. Dr. Sorensen per-
formed patent foramen ovale (PFO) procedures on certain patients suffering from migraines because 
he believed that the procedure could treat their migraines. Id. He allegedly was aware that Medicare 
and Medicaid would not approve reimbursement if the PFO procedure was performed to alleviate 
migraines. Id. To receive reimbursements, Dr. Sorensen allegedly altered patient records to make it 
appear that he performed the PFO procedures in compliance with certain stroke guidelines that he 
knew Medicare would approve. Id. 
 74 Id. at 742. Therefore, if Medicare deems a procedure not reasonable and necessary, then a phy-
sician’s certification that it is medically necessary may be false under the FCA. Id. at 743. The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that Dr. Sorensen’s claims were not factually false because he did in fact perform 
PFO procedures. Id. at 741. The court, however, determined that the claims were legally false because 
the procedures performed were not reasonable and necessary as per Medicare’s requirements. Id.; see 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 43, at 13.5.4 (discussing the factors to consid-
er when determining whether a service or procedure is medically reasonable and necessary for pur-
poses of Medicare reimbursement). 
 75 United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019). AseraCare was a qui tam 
action, and the government chose to intervene. Id. The government alleged that AseraCare falsely certi-
fied patients as terminally ill to qualify them for hospice care and receive palliative services that 
AseraCare could submit for Medicare reimbursement. Id. From 2007 to 2012, nearly 90% of AseraCare’s 
revenues came from Medicare payments. Id. at 1282. 
 76 Id. The government alleged that flawed clinical judgments formed the basis of the terminally ill 
prognoses. Id. at 1281. The court pointed out that the government did not allege that the certifying 
physicians made terminally ill prognoses based on incomplete medical records or inaccurate medical 
information. Id. at 1285, 1288. AseraCare used a local Medicare Administrative Contractor, Palmetto, 
to process AseraCare’s hospice claims for payment. Id. at 1283. Mary Jane Schultz, a registered nurse 
and former medical director at Palmetto, testified that Palmetto initially reviewed hospice care claims 
via an automated system that would check the claim to ensure no information was missing. Id. The 
system would then scan the claim for “red flags,” or information that might indicate questionable 
hospice eligibility. Id. Ms. Schultz claimed that as a result of the automated review system, she pro-
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court concluded that the objective falsehood standard properly assessed when a 
clinical judgment is false and held that the standard requires more than a show-
ing of varying medical expert opinions.77 Notably, the court stated that if a phy-
sician performed a thoughtful review of a patient’s medical records and truthful-
ly believed the patient was hospice-eligible, then the clinical judgment is not 
false regardless of whether a medical expert says otherwise after reviewing the 
same records.78 Furthermore, the court stated that if its holding troubled Con-
gress or CMS, then they should redefine hospice eligibility criteria.79 
                                                                                                                           
cessed many claims for payment without reviewing the medical information that supported the claim. 
Id. It was only if the system flagged any information that a medical team at Palmetto would then re-
view the claim’s medical documentation to determine if the government should approve or deny pay-
ment of the claim. Id. The government began its investigation into AseraCare by selecting 2,180 rec-
ords of patients who were in hospice care for one, continuous year. Id. at 1284. The government then 
sampled 223 patients from the 2,180 records. Id. at 1284–85. The government’s medical expert, Dr. 
Solomon Liao, concluded that 123 patients from the sample were not eligible for hospice care. Id. at 
1285. The relators in the case also alleged that AseraCare physicians did not perform an adequate 
review of patient medical records and “merely rubber-stamped” patients as terminally ill. Id. The court 
noted that a hospice certification contains two representations. Id. at 1296. First, a physician represents 
that a patient is terminally ill, which relates to the validity of the physician’s clinical judgment. Id. Sec-
ond, a hospice provider represents that a physician confirmed a patient is eligible, which relates to the 
hospice provider’s affirmation that the clinical judgment made is appropriate. Id. The court determined 
that the government made no claims against AseraCare regarding AseraCare’s confirmation that its 
physicians made appropriately formed clinical judgments, therefore, the central question the court 
addressed was when a clinical judgment regarding a terminally ill prognosis is false. Id. The govern-
ment did not contend that AseraCare submitted claims for “phantom patients,” forged certifications, or 
had any employees lie or keep pertinent medical information from certifying physicians. Id. at 1285.  
 77 Id. at 1297. Only showing that two medical experts reasonably disagree over a terminally ill 
prognosis is not enough to prove that clinical judgments or claims that relied on those clinical judg-
ments are false under the FCA. Id. The court explained that in order to trigger FCA liability regarding 
a hospice claim, a plaintiff must show “facts and circumstances” that are in conflict with a “properly 
formed and sincerely held clinical judgment.” Id. 
 78 See id. at 1296 (noting that “after the fact” review of medical records cannot prove a clinical 
judgment is false, even if such review demonstrates a clinical judgment is incorrect). The court pro-
vided several ways to satisfy the objective falsehood requirement. Id. at 1297. First, the court noted 
that if a certifying physician did not perform a comprehensive review of a patient’s medical records 
before providing a prognosis, then the clinical judgement is false. Id. Second, if the physician did not 
truthfully believe a patient was terminally ill, then the clinical judgment is also false. Id. Third, if a 
medical expert, after reviewing the same set of medical information, shows that no “reasonable physi-
cian” would have determined a terminally ill prognosis, then the certifying physician’s clinical judg-
ment is false. Id. All three examples the court provided reflected a situation in which confirmable facts 
could demonstrate that a false clinical judgment was the premise for a hospice certification claim, and 
therefore, the claim was false. Id. In addition, the court noted that although clinical judgments are 
indeed tied to a patient’s clinical documentation, CMS did not intend for physicians to be worried that 
a well-thought-out prognosis could later be challenged in court. Id. at 1295. 
 79 Id. at 1301. The court addressed the fact that CMS and Congress could have promulgated 
stricter guidelines for determining hospice eligibility if they wanted. Id. (citing Medicare and Medi-
caid Programs, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,008, 32,138 (June 5, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418)). 
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D. The Ninth Circuit Embraces the Third Circuit’s Reasoning and Rejects 
the Objective Falsehood Standard in the Context of Medical Necessity 
In 2020, in Winter ex rel. United States v. Garden Regional Hospital & 
Medical Center, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the objective falsehood stand-
ard.80 The relator alleged that Garden Regional Hospital certified medically 
unnecessary hospital admissions.81 The court stated that the objective false-
hood standard was not the appropriate analysis to use because the FCA did not 
differentiate between objective and subjective falsity, and did not include an 
exception for medical opinions.82 Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in 
Paulus, the court determined that subjective opinions can be false if a person 
making an opinion does not candidly believe the opinion or implicates ficti-
tious facts to support the opinion’s truth.83 The court also addressed the Elev-
enth Circuit’s holding in AseraCare.84 First, the court concluded that the Elev-
enth Circuit did not address whether it is ever possible for a clinical judgment 
to be false, only whether a medical expert’s opinion by itself is enough to 
demonstrate falsity.85 Second, the court narrowly interpreted the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s holding to apply only to hospice claims.86 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Winter ex rel. United States v. Garden Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 953 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (noting that the FCA does not require a showing of an objective falsehood). 
 81 Id. at 1115. Jane Winter, the relator, filed the qui tam action alleging that patient hospital ad-
missions did not meet the hospital’s admissions criteria and the medical records did not support a need 
for hospitalization. Id. Winter noted that a nursing facility sixty miles away sent a large number of its 
Medicare beneficiary patients to Garden Regional’s emergency room. Id. The hospital subsequently 
admitted many of these patients. Id. The company that owned the nursing home, RollinsNelson, ac-
quired another company, S&W, which managed Garden Regional. Id. Winter observed that the in-
crease in hospital admissions coincided with the RollinsNelson’s acquisition of S&W. Id. Winter 
alleged that both RollinsNelson and S&W pressured physicians to admit the nursing home patients to 
Garden Regional when it was not medically necessary. Id. Winter alleged that sixty-five hospital ad-
missions were not medically necessary and that Garden Regional submitted false claims to Medicare 
totaling nearly $1.3 million over a two-month period. Id. 
 82 Id. at 1117. 
 83 Id.; see United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the objective 
falsehood standard); see also supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (discussing the factual back-
ground and holding of Paulus). 
 84 See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1118 (mentioning that the court’s rejection of the objective falsehood 
standard did not conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 
(holding that a “reasonable disagreement” among medical experts, without additional evidence, does 
not demonstrate a clinical judgment is false). 
 85 Winter, 953 F.3d at 1118–19 (citing AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297–98). The court understood 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding to mean that a “reasonable disagreement” among medical experts, with 
no additional evidence, was never enough to prove falsity. Id. (citing AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297–
98). The court stated that the Eleventh Circuit did not hold that all subjective opinions were never 
false, particularly since it identified scenarios where a medical opinion could be false. Id. at 1119 n.7 
(citing AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1302). 
 86 Id. at 1119. In Winter, the court noted that the Eleventh Circuit distinguished AseraCare from 
Paulus—a case which dealt with medical necessity certifications—by explaining that the statute pro-
scribes Medicare reimbursement for services that are not reasonable and necessary. Id. at 1120 (citing 
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III. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: THE OBJECTIVE FALSEHOOD 
STANDARD APPROPRIATELY ANALYZES THE FALSITY OF  
CLINICAL JUDGMENTS AND ALIGNS WITH CMS’S  
INTENT FOR THE MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFIT87 
The Third Circuit’s decision in 2020, in United States ex rel. Druding v. 
Care Alternatives (Druding II), missed an opportunity to apply the objective 
falsehood standard to clinical judgments for hospice care eligibility.88 Section 
A of this Part explains the relevant distinction between when and whether a 
medical opinion can be false.89 Section B discusses why the objective false-
hood standard is the appropriate standard for analyzing the falsity of a clinical 
judgment.90 Finally, Section C analyzes how the Third Circuit’s holding con-
flicts with CMS’s intent for the MHB and overly expands FCA liability for 
hospice providers.91 
A. “When” and “Whether” a Clinical Judgment Can be False 
There is an important distinction between when and whether a clinical 
judgment can be false under the FCA.92 In Druding II, the Third Circuit reject-
ed the district court’s assertion that clinical judgments cannot be false for pur-
poses of FCA liability.93 The Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
answered the question of whether a clinical judgment can be false, agreeing 
that courts may scrutinize clinical judgments.94 In doing so, these circuits fol-
                                                                                                                           
AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1300). Given that the Ninth Circuit distinguished Winter from AseraCare and 
narrowly confined AseraCare’s holding to hospice certifications, it follows that Winter’s holding 
should likewise be narrowly understood to only apply to medical necessity claims. Compare 
AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1281 (case concerning the falsity of hospice certification claims), with Winter, 
953 F.3d at 1108 (case concerning the falsity of medical necessity claims). 
 87 Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (Lon-
don, MacMillan & Co. 1871). Through the Looking Glass is the sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Won-
derland, where Alice goes through a mirror into an alternate world where everything appears reversed. 
Id. 
 88 See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 95–98 (3d 
Cir. 2020) (rejecting the objective falsehood standard); see also supra notes 44–54 and accompanying 
text (discussing the case and holding in Druding II); infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text 
(same). 
 89 See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 108–119 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Winter ex rel. United States v. Garden Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 953 F.3d 1108, 1118–19 
(9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit only asked whether differing opinions between medi-
cal experts, without additional evidence, is enough to prove falsity (citing United States v. AseraCare, 
Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2019))); see also supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text 
(discussing how Winter distinguished itself from AseraCare). 
 93 Druding II, 952 F.3d at 98. 
 94 See supra notes 68–86 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of the circuit court 
cases dealing with the falsity of medical necessity claims and hospice certification claims). Regardless 
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low the Supreme Court’s position that opinions, in certain circumstances, can 
be false—lending to the question of when opinions can be false.95 The Elev-
enth Circuit in 2019, in United States v. AseraCare, Inc., however, went further 
and considered when medical expert testimony is sufficient to show a clinical 
judgment is false and how one could determine whether a physician appropri-
ately made a clinical judgment.96 The Third Circuit interpreted the Eleventh 
Circuit’s holding as meaning that medical expert testimony is not sufficient to 
prove falsity and that clinical judgments are never false.97 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, however, only stated that opposing medical expert opinions, with no addi-
tional evidence, is not enough to prove falsity.98 
B. The Objective Falsehood Standard Aligns with Supreme Court Precedent 
& Appropriately Determines When Medical Expert  
Testimony May Prove a Clinical Judgment is False 
In AseraCare, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that some evidence is 
relevant to proving both knowledge and falsity, making it difficult to analyze 
these elements separately from one another.99 The objective falsehood standard 
                                                                                                                           
of whether these Circuit courts chose to embrace or reject the objective falsehood standard, they were 
all in agreement that clinical judgments can be false. See Winter, 953 F.3d at 1113 (holding that clini-
cal judgments can be false); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 2 (same); United States ex rel. 
Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 742 (10th Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Paulus, 894 
F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). 
 95 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999, 2001 
(2016) (holding that “misrepresentations by omission” and half-truths can make a claim false under 
the FCA); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 
175, 176 (2015) (holding that opinions can be false if the opinion-holder does not truthfully believe 
the opinion or fabricates facts to make the opinion appear true); supra notes 63–67 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Escobar and Omnicare cases). 
 96 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1296–97, 1302 (addressing when a medical opinion is false and 
providing ways in which one could determine whether a certifying physician truly believed and 
“properly formed” their own clinical judgment); see also supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in AseraCare). 
 97 Druding II, 952 F.3d at 100. The Third Circuit noted that the Eleventh Circuit held that clinical 
judgments are not false. Id. Adding to this, the court explained that because subjective opinions can be 
false under common-law, so can medical opinions, and therefore, challenging medical expert testimo-
ny can provide evidence that a clinical judgment is false. Id. 
 98 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (holding that a plaintiff must show how an appropriately 
made clinical judgment conflicts with the “facts and circumstances” associated with the hospice care 
certification when alleging that a patient was falsely certified for hospice care). The court also stated 
that if a certifying physician truly believes their own clinical judgment, and thoroughly reviews the 
medical records prior to certifying, then the physician’s terminally ill prognosis is not false, regardless 
of whether a medical expert concludes otherwise. Id. If medical expert evidence, however, can 
demonstrate that a “reasonable physician” examining the patient’s case could not assign a terminal 
prognosis then the certifying physician’s clinical judgment could be false. Id.; see supra notes 75–79 
and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh’s Circuit’s holding in AseraCare). 
 99 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1302–05 (explaining how the district court bifurcated the trial to 
hear the element of falsity separately and erred in this decision). The district court granted Care Alter-
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acknowledges this overlap of evidence by requiring additional factual evidence 
to determine falsity.100 
The objective falsehood standard also aligns with Supreme Court prece-
dent on how opinions can be false, which can include: (1) if a person does not 
candidly believe their own opinion; (2) if a person states half-truths; or (3) if a 
person fabricates facts to support an opinion.101 The Court emphasized that if 
an individual truly believes their opinion, it cannot be false, even if proven 
incorrect later in time.102 Thus, the Court’s stance on false opinions requires 
proof of factual evidence regardless of whether those facts may also apply to 
the FCA’s knowledge requirement.103 
The Third Circuit held that medical expert opinions could prove a hospice 
certification was false if they proved the claim was noncompliant with statuto-
                                                                                                                           
native’s motion to bifurcate the trial into two phases: one phase exclusively on the falsity element of 
the FCA, and a second phase on the remaining elements of the FCA. Id. at 1286. The court precluded 
the government from presenting any evidence that also supported knowledge of falsity in phase one. 
Id. at 1303. The government contested bifurcating the trial and stated that the “elements of falsity and 
knowledge are not so distinct and separable that they may be tried separately without injustice.” Id. at 
1304. 
 100 See id. at 1296–97 (noting that a hospice claim is not false if the certifying physician’s termi-
nally ill prognosis does not exhibit an objective falsehood); see also supra notes 75–79 (discussing 
AseraCare and examples the Eleventh Circuit provided on how to prove objective falsity). If a medi-
cal expert is unable to show anything other than a reasonably varying opinion over a terminally ill 
prognosis, then the certifying physician’s clinical judgment is not false. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1296–
97. 
 101 See supra notes 63–67, 95 and accompanying text (describing relevant Supreme Court cases 
discussing when opinions can be false). 
 102 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 186 
(2015). Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, noted that to categorize a candidly held opinion—that 
may turn out to be inaccurate—as a false material assertion would improperly converge “facts and 
opinions.” Id. at 183. She went on to state that a fact possesses certainty, whereas an opinion is a be-
lief or viewpoint. Id. An opinion naturally conveys that some probability of inaccuracy exists. Id. 
Therefore, when a person gives an opinion, they are inferring that the opinion provided is frankly 
held, that they “believe[] that [the] basis for the opinion is sufficient,” and that they are “not certain of 
[the] result.” See id. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing what it means when a person gives an 
opinion). Justice Kagan emphasized that § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 expressly stated that liabil-
ity for opinions could only attach to “untrue statements of . . . fact,” not “untrue statements.” Id. at 183 
(Kagan, J.); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (explaining a security buyer’s right of action for statements 
a security issuer makes in a registration statement). 
 103 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1304 (noting that it is not possible to analyze the falsity and 
knowledge elements of an FCA claim separately without some degree of inequity). In Omnicare, the 
Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must show facts that demonstrate a “reasonable person” would 
find the statement misleading. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 194. In applying Omnicare’s statement to medi-
cal opinions, a plaintiff would need to identify facts that prove a “reasonable physician” would not 
believe a patient was terminally ill. See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (stating that if a medical expert 
determined that no “reasonable physician” would determine a patient was eligible for hospice after 
reviewing the medical records, then a clinical judgment could be false); Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 194 
(applying the “reasonable person” standard). 
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ry certification requirements.104 If a certifying physician truly believed a pa-
tient was terminally ill, however, the Third Circuit’s holding would conflict 
with Supreme Court precedent.105 Alternatively, a medical expert could show, 
for example, that a certifying physician: (1) did not review the patient’s medi-
cal records before certifying, and therefore, did not make a well-thought-out 
prognosis; (2) intentionally omitted relevant facts in the certification report 
that would preclude hospice eligibility; or (3) created untrue facts in order to 
make a patient appear eligible.106 These types of objective findings would lead 
a medical expert to deduce that no “reasonable physician” would have thought 
a patient was hospice eligible.107 
C. The Objective Falsehood Standard Aligns With CMS’s  
Intent For Hospice Eligibility Criteria 
A patient first makes the difficult decision to elect hospice care and waive 
any curative treatment.108 When a patient receives approval for hospice, CMS 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II), 952 F.3d 89, 97 (3d Cir. 
2020) (noting that a plaintiff could prove legal falsity by showing that Care Alternatives did not meet 
certain regulatory requirements for properly certifying hospice claims); see also 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 
(certification requirements of terminal illness); supra notes 7, 27–29 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing hospice certification and eligibility requirements). Section 418.22(b) requires that a clinical judg-
ment serve as the basis for a hospice certification. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b). It also requires that the phy-
sician provide an explanation that supports a terminally ill prognosis. Id. § 418.22(b)(3). The physi-
cian must confirm via signature that the physician’s explanation is based on a review of the patient’s 
medical records or a patient examination. Id. § 418.22(b)(3)(iii). In AseraCare, the court noted that to 
assert that a clinical judgement is wrong by evaluating the medical documentation on its own would 
improperly read into the regulation’s language. 938 F.3d at 1294. The requirements only state that 
relevant medical documentation “accompany” the hospice certification. Id. The court went on to say 
that as long as a physician performs an adequate review of the medical records before certifying a 
patient as terminally ill, then the clinical judgment appropriately determines eligibility for a patient. 
Id. 
 105 See Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 186 (noting that truthfully made opinions are not false, even if they 
are proven wrong after the fact); see also supra notes 63–67, 102 and accompanying text (discussing 
relevant Supreme Court cases). 
 106 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297, 1302 (providing examples of what amounts to an objective 
falsehood and explaining how to determine whether a certifying physician’s clinical judgement was 
“truly communicated”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (listing the requirements for certification); supra 
notes 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing hospice eligibility and certification requirements). 
 107 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1297 (noting that the government needed to show more than a 
reasonably varying opinion over a terminally ill prognosis); see also supra notes 63–67 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “false” or “fraudulent” under the FCA). 
The Eleventh Circuit, in AseraCare, stated that in order to demonstrate a false hospice certification, a 
plaintiff must bring forth “facts and circumstances” that prove a clinical judgment was not “properly 
formed.” 938 F.3d at 1297. 
 108 See Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 50,452, 50,471 (Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 405, 418) (noting that the patient and physician share in any decisions made concerning 
hospice care, and that patients are entitled to access all benefits available to them under Medicare at 
the appropriate time). CMS went on to explain that beneficiaries of hospice care have “certain guaran-
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relies on a physician to make an appropriate clinical judgment as to whether 
that patient is eligible.109 Unlike medical necessity issues where CMS only 
reimburses for reasonable and necessary services, hospice eligibility criteria 
are not so categorical.110 CMS has acknowledged that patients do not always 
show appreciable deterioration in their health at the time of recertification.111 It 
is not possible to predict the life expectancy of a patient with complete certain-
ty.112 If it were possible, statutory requirements would not continue to permit 
unlimited sixty-day recertification periods.113 
Furthermore, providing such strict guidelines could deny a Medicare pa-
tient’s entitlement to hospice care.114 Congress was cognizant of this when it 
enacted the MHB.115 Moreover, CMS has not amended the hospice eligibility 
                                                                                                                           
teed rights,” including the right to ask for a second review should a physician determine they are no 
longer eligible for hospice care. Id. 
 109 See 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b) (stating that a hospice certification relies on the physician’s or med-
ical director’s clinical judgment and clinical documentation supporting the prognosis must accompany 
the certification); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1295 (stating “[w]e believe that the certifying phy-
sicians have the best clinical experience, competence and judgment to make the determination that an 
individual is terminally ill” (quoting Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 38,234, 48,247 (Aug. 7, 2013) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418))). In AseraCare, the court observed that CMS chose the word 
“support,” rather than “demonstrate or prove,” inferring that CMS did not expect medical records to 
“objectively” prove a terminally ill prognosis. 938 F.3d at 1294. 
 110 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (providing clear guidance that Medicare may not reim-
burse for services that are not reasonable and necessary), with 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (providing that 
hospice certification relies on the clinical judgment of the certifying physician with no clear criteria 
given other than that supporting documentation must accompany the certification and medical infor-
mation must support the prognosis). See supra notes 27–29, 43 and accompanying text (discussing 
hospice eligibility and certification requirements, and the factors to consider when determining 
whether a service or procedure is medically reasonable and necessary for purposes of Medicare reim-
bursement); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1295 (discussing that CMS has the right to deny approv-
al for any hospice services that it does not deem reasonable and necessary (citing 79 Fed Reg., at 
50,470)). 
 111 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1293 (discussing how CMS understands the complexity of deter-
mining a terminally ill prognosis and how a physician must weigh many considerations when a pa-
tient’s illness has not appreciably worsened (citing Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. at 50,471)); see 
also Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 48,243 (recognizing that hospice care needs are unique and 
involve a holistic treatment approach); Medicare Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 39,384, 39,399 (Aug. 6, 
2009) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418) (noting that patients may not “show measurable decline” 
when they are due for recertification). If a physician feels that a patient’s lack of “measurable decline” 
warrants justification, the physician can include that in the certification’s progress note. Medicare 
Program, 74 Fed. Reg. at 39,399. 
 112 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1304 (stating that CMS has recognized that making a terminally ill 
prognosis is not an “exact science” (citing Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. at 50,470)); see also supra 
notes 7, 27–29 and accompanying text (explaining hospice eligibility and the certification process and 
requirements). 
 113 See 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (noting that although there are additional recertification procedures to 
follow, there is no specified limit to the amount of 60-day recertification periods). 
 114 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing a Medicare beneficiary’s role in elect-
ing hospice care). 
 115 See Medicare Program, 79 Fed. Reg. at 50,471 (noting that CMS has always believed that 
there are individual considerations to take into account when determining if a patient is terminally ill 
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criteria.116 Such inaction implies that CMS continues to hold clinical judg-
ments regarding hospice eligibility in high regard.117 The objective falsehood 
standard minimizes liability for clinical judgments made in earnest that, alt-
hough conceivably imprecise, are not false.118 By applying the objective false-
hood standard, questionable hospice certification claims do not survive sum-
mary judgment and do not unnecessarily inundate the judiciary.119 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2020 decision 
in United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives (Druding II) conflicts 
with CMS’s intent for the Medicare Hospice Benefit and leaves physicians 
more vulnerable to FCA liability. The Third Circuit neglected to acknowledge 
that the objective falsehood standard appropriately aligns with the Supreme 
Court’s precedent regarding false opinions. The objective falsehood standard 
recognizes that certain factual evidence can speak to both the FCA’s falsity and 
knowledge elements. Thus, something more than conflicting medical expert 
testimony is needed to prove a clinical judgment is false, even if the evidence 
also pertains to the knowledge element. Applying this falsity standard ensures 
that physicians can have confidence that their clinical judgments will stand up 
                                                                                                                           
and should receive hospice care services); see also AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 (noting that CMS 
could have chosen more demanding clinical criteria to determine whether a patient was eligible for 
hospice—which would have “minimized the role of clinical judgment[s]”—however, it purposefully 
chose to elevate the importance of a clinical judgment in determining hospice eligibility). 
 116 See Medicare Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 47,070, 47,070 (Aug. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 418) (showing that in the latest Medicare Program update released, there have been no 
proposed changes to the hospice eligibility criteria as defined in 42 C.F.R § 418.22); see also supra 
note 7 and accompanying text (explaining that the court in AseraCare acknowledged that, at the time 
the case was heard, CMS had not amended the hospice eligibility criteria and that comments made 
from CMS’s rulemaking indicated that “well-founded clinical judgments should be granted defer-
ence”); AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1295. 
 117 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing that CMS has not proposed any chang-
es to hospice eligibility criteria). When CMS considered changing the format of the patient election 
statement and addendum that the patient fills out at the time of certification, CMS stated that it did not 
want to provide any examples of completed forms because every patient’s terminally ill prognosis is 
different and should be evaluated individually. Medicare Program, 85 Fed. Reg. at 47,088. 
 118 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 (acknowledging that it will be more difficult now for a plain-
tiff to prove falsity using the objective falsehood standard because it will not be enough to simply 
secure a medical expert that can disagree with a clinical judgment after reviewing “cold medical rec-
ords”); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 
182–86 (2015) (discussing the difference between a fictional fact and a frankly held opinion that may 
turn out to be inaccurate, but is not false). 
 119 See AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301 (stating that the objective falsehood standard will be a more 
demanding standard to satisfy); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), 56(a) (setting forth the procedure for 
pleading in the case of fraud and summary judgment); supra notes 63–67, 102 and accompanying text 
(discussing relevant Supreme Court cases concerning falsity of opinions and explaining that an ear-
nestly held opinion is not a false material fact). 
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in court. Likewise, the objective falsehood standard minimizes the risk of 
denying Medicare patients their hospice benefits simply because their terminal 
illness did not run its course in six months or the patient did not show consid-
erable debility at the time of recertification. 
Docketed September 16, 2020, Care Alternatives filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari. On February 22, 2021, the Supreme Court denied Care Alterna-
tives’ petition. The Court missed an opportunity to provide needed guidance on 
the falsity of clinical judgments and the use of the objective falsehood standard 
in determining when a clinical judgment is false. 
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